Administrative lies and philosopher-kings by Simpson, David I
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
1-1-1996 
Administrative lies and philosopher-kings 
David I. Simpson 
University of Wollongong, dsimpson@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Simpson, David I., Administrative lies and philosopher-kings 1996, 45-65. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/461 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Administrative Lies and Philosopher-Kings 
David Simpson 
Philosophical Inquiry, 18, 1996: 45-65 
1. Introduction 
I want to consider the question: whether it is acceptable for those who govern to lie 
to those they govern. I suspect that many would reply that while it is an ideal of 
liberal and enlightenment values that such acts not occur, psychological, epistemic 
and political realities make them necessary for good government, and therefore 
acceptable under certain conditions. Rather than address directly the intuitions 
behind such a response, I shall consider the question in the light of the apparent 
recommendation in the Republic that the rulers of the city of the Republic (the 
philosopher-kings) sometimes lie to its citizens. 
This focusing of the question has the primary virtue of paring the issues down to an 
ideal case (given a certain reading of the Republic, it sets out the ideal conditions 
under which such rulers' lies - what we might call 'governing', or 'administrative' lies 
- might be acceptable), and so clearly focusing the question of in-principle 
acceptability. It has the secondary virtue of allowing me to highlight an aspect of the 
Republic that, while possibly central to the work and to our understanding of it, 
receives surprisingly little attention. Inasmuch as the recommendation is noted, the 
actual lies mentioned in the Republic tend to be regarded and judged as a bundle - as 
the "noble lie" - and much of the subtlety and interest of this feature of the work is 
lost. 
I will begin by noting two discussions that do treat the recommendation in detail and 
in the context of the overall structure of the Republic: the discussions by T. C. 
Brickhouse and N. D. Smith (1983), and by C. D. C. Reeve (1988). These also offer in-
principle defences of rulers' lies, in that they argue that in the context of the Republic, 
and in the light of its metaphysics, the recommendation that rulers should sometimes 
lie is coherent. 
I will then, in the body of the paper, show how the recommendation in the Republic, 
in spite of these defences, is incoherent. And I will argue that the failure of the ideal 
case undermines attempts to rationalise administrative deceit by reference to some 
sort of political realism. I will also, however, qualify the assumption that Plato does 
in fact recommend that his philosopher-kings rule a city with lies. 
To begin, and having flagged the future qualification, we need to grant some 
minimal assumptions, in order for the discussion to get started. We need to accept 
that Plato has Socrates recommend that the rulers lie - that Socrates recommends 
practices that amount to lying, and recommends such practices as lies. We also need 
to accept that the philosopher-kings introduced in response to the Third Wave are 
rulers who are to lie. 
Given this, we can say that rulers' lies are mentioned at four places in the Republic: 
during the discussion of the education of children, when Socrates recommends that 
the stories that are told in this education are censored (378b-d); in the discussion of 
medicinal lies (382a-e); with the recommendation of the noble lie, or myth of the 
metals (414b-460c); and in the recommendation of a sexual lottery to control breeding 
(459d-460c). Plato seems to think that the practices referred to are relevantly similar: 
see 382d1-4 for a reference from the verbal medicinal lies back to the education; see 
414c1-2 for a reference from the noble lie back to the medicinal lies; and see 459c7-d1 
for a reference from the breeding lottery back to the medicinal lies. Reeve agrees with 
this assessment. Brickhouse and Smith think that the noble lie must be set aside as an 
educative myth (1983, pp. 82-84).1 
A charge of incoherence regarding the recommendation supposed here arises from 
the apparent conflict between the required nature of the city's rulers and their 
required practices. This apparent incoherence can be seen as an aspect of the general 
problem of the philosophers going back down into the cave. The problem seems to 
be: the city must be ruled by philosophers if it is to be just; philosophers must by 
nature love truth; rulers must by necessity lie. 
                                                
1  Brickhouse & Smith claim that in an educative myth, "while starting with something that is 
strictly speaking false, one arrives at a conclusion that is true. Thus, one is not deceived by a 
proper myth; one is enlightened by it" (1993, p. 84). The noble lie, they think, begins from the 
falsehood that all people are born of the earth and have different metals in their souls, but leads 
to the truth (by Plato's lights) that there are by nature three classes of people, and that all 
citizens are like brothers. 
2. The True, and Verbal Lies 
The common ground between the solutions offered by Brickhouse and Smith and by 
Reeve is the idea that the lies are a necessary aspect of the attempt to create an 
imitation of justice in the city, and that within Platonic metaphysics the lies of the 
rulers and the truth the rulers love operate on different planes and do not come into 
direct conflict. This idea does show, I think, how the lies may introduce no 
incoherence, in Plato's terms. It also offers a plausible explanation of why the lies are 
treated, within the Republic, as relatively unproblematic. Yet this interpretation also 
makes clear, against its intentions, one way in which the Republic comes up against 
the difficulty of bringing together metaphysically distinct categories: justice and the 
city; the real and appearance; truth and imitation. 
The True 
The central plank of Brickhouse and Smith's defence is Vlastos's emphasis of the 
distinction between sentential and evaluative senses of 'true' (see Vlastos 1965, 1; 
Brickhouse and Smith 1983, pp. 86-7). Evaluatively, 'true' is close to 'real', as when 
someone might synonymously be called "a true friend" or "a real friend". Brickhouse 
and Smith suggest that we regard the truth the philosophers love as evaluative truth, 
applying to non-linguistic objects and arranged in various degrees (1983, p. 87). 
Thus, being single-mindedly devoted to the truth need not require that one always 
"tell the truth"; it requires that one is unwaveringly concerned with "what is real" or 
"what is good" (1983, p. 86). 
On this account, the rulers should be considered on the model of craftsmen, desiring 
that each created thing be the best possible image of the appropriate form. For 
statecraft, the appropriate form is justice, and in imitating justice the rulers may have 
to honour the true in seemingly paradoxical ways, including lying. 
The condition that must be met, ... if Plato's account of his rulers is to be 
coherent, is that each time they lie the product of their actions must be a 
closer approximation of Justice than honesty would have been. Wherever 
this is the case, the paradox that they will be liars and yet love the truth 
above all else vanishes, for it is their love of truth vis-à-vis Justice that 
requires the lies they tell. (Brickhouse and Smith 1983, pp. 87-8) 
This gives Brickhouse and Smith a model for their analysis of the actual 
recommended lies. They note that Socrates' argument in Book 1 (see 331a-d), that it 
could not be just to tell the truth to a madman, fits this model. As Plato would regard 
children in the same light as madmen, they say, lies to children also fit the model - 
justice (so 'truth') will be aided by sometimes lying to them in their education. In the 
administration of breeding, if the rulers were sentiently honest, they would run the 
risk of dissension among the spirited and easily wounded guardians. This would 
produce disharmony and strife, and hence injustice. The lies, say Brickhouse and 
Smith, avoid this and create a sense of brotherhood, thus allowing the breeding 
program to continue. They thus help produce a better image of justice. 
Provided that the sentential falsehoods in which they engage are well-fitted 
to the creation and preservation of the clearest possible images of the Form of 
Justice in each case, they are, in Plato's sense, the truest of the sentences that 
could be spoken by the rulers. (Brickhouse and Smith 1983, pp. 88-9) 
Verbal lies 
Reeve bases his approach on the distinction Socrates draws at the end of Book 2 
between true (or real) lies and verbal lies. The distinction is drawn in the midst of the 
argument for the demand that the gods not be represented as using lies or disguise. 
According to this argument, verbal lies are useful to men, like a drug. They are 
useful against enemies, against friends who attempt wrong through madness or 
ignorance, and when in stories we are ignorant of the past but want to make the 
story as much like the truth as possible. Yet the gods are not ignorant of the past, do 
not fear their enemies, and do not have foolish or mad friends. Having no need for 
lies, the gods do not lie, and should not be represented as lying. 
Socrates says that a true lie is hated by both gods and men (382a-e). According to 
Reeves translation of this passage, in a true lie someone lies "about the governing 
things to the governing part of himself." Socrates says that "to lie in the psyche about 
the things that are and to have been lied to and to be unlearned and to have and hold 
the lie there is what everyone would least of all accept ...". A true lie is "error in the 
psyche of the one who has been lied to" (Reeve 1988, p. 208). On the other hand, a 
verbal lie, or a lie in words, is "a sort of imitation of the affection in the psyche, an 
image of it that comes into being after it, and not an altogether pure lie" (Reeve 1988, 
p. 209). 
Reeve regards the governing things, or the things that are, as the forms, and says that 
the governing part of the psyche is reason. "Hence a real lie is, in essence, one that 
misleads reason, and so prevents the psyche itself from achieving the good" (1988, p. 
209). 
In contrast, verbal lies, the imitations of real lies, only appear to mislead the 
governing part of the psyche. When used by one who knows the good they can steer 
those misled by madness or ignorance towards the good. Their use, Reeve claims, 
does not conflict with, but aids, a love of truth and the good. On the other hand, non-
philosopher citizens do not know the good itself, so their lies might be real, and so 
might lead the rulers and the city away from the good (1988, pp. 209-210). 
According to Reeve, then, the medicinal lies, the myth of the metals, and the sexual 
lottery, are all intended to be verbal lies, and they are all deceptions that lead the 
citizens and the city as a whole towards the good. 
The myth of the metals aims to tie the citizens together in bonds of love or 
friendship. Since such friendship is in fact well founded in mutual self-interest, those 
who believe the myth do not come to believe a real lie, for their belief leads them 
towards the good. Reeve says that instead of the rigged sexual lottery, contraception 
(I take it, enforced contraception) would be a better solution to the eugenics problem, 
since those citizens denied sex through the lottery are not compensated in the normal 
course of events. However, for contingent historical reasons it is the best solution 
(1988, pp. 210-11). 
Reeve claims that the members of the city are not the victims of false ideology; rather, 
their ideology is falsely sustained. Given that the producers and guardian auxiliaries 
are by nature incapable of knowing the good directly, it is best, and best for them, 
that they are led to the good (by the ideology-free philosopher-kings) through 
judicious verbal lies (1988, pp. 212-213). 
3. The Philosopher 
These defences share two important features. First, both take the lies to be required 
by the inability of ordinary citizens to recognise their best interest when presented 
with the truth, since their judgement will be guided by spirit or appetite.2 Second, 
                                                
2  The defenses therefore share basic features with an "educative myth" defense. The difference is 
that they claim, not that the citizens will be brought via falsehood always to have true beliefs, 
but that they will be brought via falsehood to participate in a truer imitation. 
they find the acceptability of the lies in the distance between those who lie (the 
philosopher-kings) and those who are lied to, and this distance in turn rests on the 
distinction between the forms and the worldly instances that imitate those forms. I 
will argue that this apparently justifying distance in fact generates the incoherence in 
question. First, however, we need to review the philosophers themselves. 
According to these defences philosophers may lie because they are able to lie well, 
and they do lie because they must. This is a view that fits well with much of the 
Republic. Like a physician who is able to promote health through the administration 
of poison, the philosopher is able to cure ills that impede the realisation of justice in 
the city through administration of the drug of deceit. And the philosophers' lies are 
required because these ills are by hypothesis beyond the reach of the mere dietician's 
advice. 
[W]hile an inferior doctor is adequate for people who are willing to follow a 
regimen and don't need drugs, when drugs are needed, we know that a 
bolder doctor is required. (459c) 
Such people will not be cured by mere truth-telling, for the truth entailing their cure 
is beyond the grasp of those who have these ills. They are unable, in their actual 
constitution, to recognise the coincidence between their self-interest and the 
requirements for the best imitation of justice. 
The philosopher is able to lie well because he has come to gaze upon the forms, and 
he has come to love the forms above all else. He knows the model for the worldly 
image, and so can use that, rather than the perspective of mortals, as a guide for his 
actions. 
A true philosopher unwaveringly loves all and only that knowledge which makes 
clear the unchanging and everlasting reality of the forms; he is a friend of truth and 
justice, hates untruth, gives up the pleasures of the body, is moderate, generous and 
courageous, learns easily, has a good memory, and does not gossip (see, e.g., 485a-
487a; 490b; 500b). 
The question of a philosopher-king's motivation is complex,3 but someone with such 
a nature, a true philosopher, will not desire leadership. He or she will become a ruler 
                                                
3  For an interesting discussion, see Vernezze (1992). 
only if requested, and because the good (and thus the philosopher's duty and best 
interest) is served by doing so (519d-521a). This request is unlikely, since the many 
find most philosophers to be vicious and the rest to be useless (see 488-496a). 
If, however, true philosophers do become rulers, their task is to set their city in order 
(500c-d; 540a-b) and bind it together (520a). This task is a craft, involving the creation 
of an image or imitation. The imitation is ultimately of the good, by way of imitations 
of certain positive virtues: justice, truth, moderation and courage. The philosopher 
moulds his own character so as to become divine and ordered as far as humans can 
be; and when a king, he moulds the characters of men in private and public life, 
creating images of moderation and justice, and of popular virtue generally (500d). 
The philosopher-kings are like painters, using the divine model to sketch the outline 
of the city (500e). They would take the city and men's characters as a sketching slate; 
first wiping the slate clean, then sketching the shape of the constitution. 
 [A]s they work, they'd look often in each direction, towards the natures of 
justice, beauty, moderation, and the like, on the one hand, and towards those 
they're trying to put into human beings, on the other. ... 
 They'd erase one thing, I suppose, and draw in another until they'd made 
characters for human beings that the gods would love as much as possible. 
(501b) 
The image here is central to the type of interpretation Brickhouse and Smith and 
Reeve propose. The philosopher-king bridges the gap between form and 
instantiation: as philosopher, he dwells in the daylight and knows the good; as king, 
he returns to the cave and engages with appearance, imitation, and opinion. 
If the philosopher-kings are liars, they cannot be gods, given the argument that the 
gods do not lie. And Socrates only asks they become "as divine and ordered as a 
human being can" (500d). Yet while mortal, they are special and specially trained - 
crucially, they are able to associate with the forms - and they do not sit comfortably 
in the flow of the Republic. 
The city in speech has been developed in Books 2-5, and by the time of the Third 
Wave (471c ff) it is taken to be ruled by "complete guardian". These are "the best of 
the guardians ... best at guarding the city" (412c). The notion of such rulers is 
introduced after the Book 3 account of the education of young guardians and of 
general principles of education has concluded at 412b. The complete guardians must 
be knowledgeable and capable, and they must care for the city and pursue its 
advantage. Such care requires that they love the city, which in turn requires that they 
believe always that what is advantageous to the city is advantageous to themselves 
(412c-d). 
To discover whether guardians have these features, but especially the crucial feature 
of only pursuing the city's advantage, they must be observed from childhood and 
tested (412e-414a). Only those who pass the tests are to be accepted as complete 
guardians. At this point the proposal is made that the stories making up the noble lie 
(with the dual conclusions that all in the city are siblings and the city and land a 
mother, and that the social divisions of the citizens are pre-established) should be 
told to the entire city. 
Note that these rulers are not the philosopher-kings. The point is perhaps obvious, 
but it is not, I think, always recognised, and its implications may not always be 
appreciated. Reeve is clear about the successive changes in rulers and constitution 
(1988, §4.2), but he only draws on part of what this particular change implies: that 
after the Third Wave the rulers have genuine knowledge. 
The city thus ruled is accepted by Glaucon as completely good (427e), and the 
following passages establish that it has wisdom, courage, moderation, and (because 
of these virtues) justice (428a-433e). But Plato does not let Socrates rest with this. 
Book 5 begins the three waves (which take up Book 6 and 7 as well), where Glaucon 
and the others challenge the possibility of such a city. The First and Second Waves 
deal with the role of women and the holding of women and children in common. 
This is introduced in a peculiar (presumably ironic) way. At 449c Adeimantus 
demands that Socrates explain the claim at 424 that women and children will be kept 
in common. Socrates then (451c-457b) defends a new idea, that women and male 
guardians will share their entire way of life, in response to a supposed First Wave. 
He responds to the original demand as the Second Wave (457c-471b), within which 
the sexual lottery and the disguise of parentage are introduced. 
The Third Wave is Glaucon's objection that despite all that has preceded, Socrates 
has not shown "whether its possible for this constitution [and so, the city ruled by 
complete guardians] to come into being and in what way it could be brought about" 
(471c). 
Socrates then complains that he had been aiming for a model "to discover what 
justice itself is like and what the completely just man would be like" (472c) and that a 
model should not be condemned just because it could not come into being; and he 
demands that it be enough that he show how a city could come to be governed in a 
way that most closely approximates the model (473a). 
And so, searching for the smallest possible change to existing cities, it turns out that 
they will have no rest from evil until 
 ... philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading 
men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power 
and philosophy entirely coincide.... (473c-d) 
Socrates seems to allow that this suggestion is outrageous, and Glaucon agrees, and 
from here we get the account of philosopher-kings. 
The philosopher-kings do not, therefore, arise through elaboration, as the previous 
rulers did, but are forced on Socrates by a demand he claims to find unreasonable 
and beside the point, but which Glaucon presents as a challenge to what he seems to 
take to be the whole project. 
4. Imitations of the False 
I believe that the problem with the defences, and the problem with a requirement 
that philosopher-kings lie, is that lying corrupts a (Platonic) philosophical nature. 
The objection can be made in two ways. 
Lying as a procedure 
According to the short argument, the lies are corrupting because they require, in 
their very performance, denial of the philosopher's nature. This nature is defined by 
its unwavering focus on the good, the model on which the constitution of the city is 
based; the procedure of lying requires turning away from the good. 
A true lie, as I have noted, is an untruth about the governing things, or the things 
that are - about the forms - which is held in the governing part of oneself, or in one's 
reason. A verbal lie, on the other hand, is an imitation of this untruth in the soul, 
which comes after it and is not an altogether pure lie. This point is important. A 
verbal lie is not an imitation of truth, but of true falsehood, and as an impure 
instantiation it falls short, not of truth, but of the falsehood we get in a true lie. An 
imitation of truth would be an utterance that aimed at truth, but like all instantiations 
fell short. An imitation of untruth, on the other hand, is an utterance that aims at 
falsehood, an intentional falsehood that falls short of true falsehood. 
Reeve, who bases his defence specifically on the distinction, says that verbal lies, 
being imitations of real lies, only appear to mislead the governing part of the psyche, 
and then says that non-philosophers should not lie because they might unknowingly 
produce real lies. But this, I think, is to turn away from the crucial relation. The 
important point is not that philosophers, as philosophers, know the difference 
between true and imitative lies; the important point is that in telling imitative or 
verbal lies they knowingly produce imitations of these true lies, that precede and 
form the exemplars for the verbal lies. 
Similarly, Brickhouse and Smith claim that the sentential falsehoods are the truest of 
the sentences that could be spoken by the rulers in the light of their overall task of 
imitating the good. But these sentences themselves, as imitations of untruth, are a 
corrupting element in the overall relation of the rulers to the forms, and thereby a 
corruption of the nature of the rulers. Brickhouse and Smith focus on the overall 
image, the city as a whole; but this image is built up of parts, whose nature and 
relation are constituted through particular imitative acts. 
One might respond that though the parts are imperfect, the behaviour of the rulers 
nonetheless leads the city, and thereby the citizens, towards the good. Again, 
however, the problem is that the fact of this behaviour undermines the characteristic 
that enables the rulers to know and aim at the good in the first place. Their 
philosophical nature is directly undermined, because in lying they produce 
imitations of true lies, of falsehoods about the forms, and thereby undermine their 
nature as imitators of the good. It may be that the lies are necessary, but if so, then 
adequate rulers are necessarily impossible. 
This argument rests on my interpretation of the structure of a verbal lie when uttered 
by a philosopher. So, a philosopher uttering a verbal lie takes the false as a model, 
and is thereby no philosopher. But this interpretation may be controversial. It might 
be objected that when a philosopher utters a verbal lie the proposition expressed 
imitates the false, but the philosophers act is an act in imitation of the true and the 
good. I am unconvinced by this; nonetheless, it may help if we consider the issue in a 
different aspect. 
Lying as a practice 
The philosophers who will be fit to rule desire the truth and always pursue it in 
every way (489e). They desire the whole of wisdom (475b) and, being able to 
embrace the nature of things themselves, possess knowledge (476ff). They also 
possess the virtues of courage, moderation and so on mentioned earlier (487a). This 
establishes their nature, but it is not enough. Socrates asks whether we would entrust 
the city to them alone when they have reached maturity in age and education (487a). 
To this Adeimantus replies that while all should find Socrates' argument convincing 
they will still reject the conclusion, because they know that among philosophers most 
are cranks or vicious, and the decent ones are made useless to the city because of the 
very way of life Socrates recommends (487a-d). And Socrates says that they are right. 
The useless philosophers seem initially to be accepted as true philosophers in 
Socrates sense. Their uselessness is partly a matter of ordinary people not being able 
to recognise the benefits they offer, just as the ignorant might dismiss a navigator as 
a stargazer (488) - it is perceived uselessness. This means that the people will not ask 
them to rule. Furthermore, just because they have true philosophical natures they 
will not desire rule, and will not ask to rule: "It isn't for the ruler, if he's truly any use, 
to beg the others to accept his rule" (489c). Thus, in cities as they stand, those few 
genuine philosophers who exist will indeed be useless, since their talents will be 
neither requested nor offered. 
The vicious among philosophers are divided into two groups: those with true 
philosophic natures who are corrupted, and those who unworthily establish 
themselves in philosophy's way of life and merely imitate the philosophic nature. I 
am interested here in the corrupt among the vicious. 
The problem for those with true natures is that "each of the things we praised in that 
nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and to drag it away from philosophy" 
(491b), and all good things - beauty, health, physical strength, powerful relatives - 
also corrupt it (491c). 
[T]he more vigorous any seed, developing plant, or animal is, the more it is 
deficient in the things that are appropriate for it to have when it is deprived 
of suitable food, season, or location. (491d) 
With souls too, "those with the best natures become outstandingly bad when they 
receive a bad upbringing" (491e). 
In cities as they are, young people are subjected to the demands and values of the 
crowd, and to the threat the crowd poses to any who remain unpersuaded (492c-d). 
Someone could only survive the education of the mob by a divine dispensation 
(492e). Furthermore, those called sophists merely repeat the wisdom of the mob, 
inculcating the knack of handling this beast (493a-c). 
Furthermore, anyone beginning life with the attributes of a philosopher - ease of 
learning, a good memory, courage and so on - will be courted and honoured by 
fellow citizens, "especially if his body has a nature that matches that of his soul" 
(494b). If such a person is advised that these attributes are not enough, and that he 
must work like a slave to attain understanding, he is unlikely to listen, and if he does 
listen, those who courted him will attempt to prevent him being persuaded, and will 
attack the persuader (494d-e). There is no chance such a person will practice 
philosophy. 
[W]hen someone with a philosophic nature is badly brought up, the very 
components of his nature - together with the other so-called goods, such as 
wealth and other similar advantages - are themselves in a way the cause of 
his falling away. (495a) 
We find, then, that what we might call a complete philosopher requires not merely a 
set of attributes, but also a suitable environment, one that will provide appropriate 
education and nurture, leading to a complete philosopher's life. This part of the 
discussion seems crucial to our understanding of the ambiguous way the 
philosopher's nature is treated. It is a nature in the sense of a given potentiality, but it 
is also a nature in the sense of a developed character and way of life. We find also 
that a nature is not inherently stable, and that in fact a philosopher's nature is, by 
virtue of its attributes, peculiarly unstable, and peculiarly dangerous (see 495a). 
We see this double aspect of the nature when the discussion returns to the first 
group. For the philosophers who survive the fall into viciousness are also harmed by 
arising in inappropriate cities. They do defend themselves from this viciousness: 
like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail 
driven by the wind, the philosopher - seeing others filled with lawlessness - 
is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and 
impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content. 
(496d-e) 
Yet this is merely survival. While they are true philosophers in the sense of having a 
philosophical potential, they don't grow to their full potential and into a fully 
philosophical way of life. Under a suitable constitution a philosopher like this will 
have fuller growth, "and he'll save the community as well as himself." Under 
unsuitable constitutions, such a nature "fails to develop its full power and declines 
into a different character" (479b). It is truly useless. 
What we need, then, are a people who will ask philosophers to rule (or a god who 
will make kings into philosophers) (499b), and a constitution that will enable 
philosophers to develop a truly philosophical way of life. 
It may be suggested that once we have philosophical natures inculcated into a 
philosophical way of life, the lying required by rule itself presents no threat. Such an 
objection could draw support from Socrates, who at 539e for example say of young 
philosophers that, while gaining experience in civil matters, "they must be tested to 
see whether they'll remain steadfast when they're pulled this way and that or shift 
their ground." So the idea could be that the whole point of developing such a way of 
life is to develop a nature that is not harmed by its engagement in base practices. 
However, the way of life is not a static state. It is a process of exemplification and 
nurture of its attributes. It is not a matter of the nature being strong and so able to 
demean itself with impunity, but a matter of it being able to maintain itself as a way 
of life without falling. A philosopher, in Plato's ascetic conception, cannot hope to go 
along with the demands and values of the crowd and the practices of politics in the 
city, but remain somehow apart. Socrates makes it clear that this will not do, and that 
a philosopher's very attributes makes him or her especially vulnerable to such 
pressures. A philosopher, if the fall into viciousness is to be avoided, must stand 
apart from the practices that diminish and distort a philosopher's way of life. Yet a 
philosopher, so it seems, must lie in administration. 
It might be said that in the new city the crowd will behave differently and different 
values and requirements will imbue its politics, but if administrative lies are 
required, then a feature of politics prior to this city is a feature of this city. 
The philosopher's may be a nature defended against contact with base things, but it 
is not a nature defended against engagement in base practices itself. For the sign of 
its greatness as a nature and a way of life is its practice. The testing referred to earlier 
is to see whether the young can come into contact with base practices without 
weakening and engaging in them. Once philosophers engage in cowardice, 
immoderation, gossip, ... or untruthfulness, they show that they are not true 
philosophers, because they behave like the crowd. So if we insist that philosophers 
lie, it is like insisting that they experience cowardice - and this would invoke a 
psychological theory that is not Plato's. 
At this point some might suggest that lying is better seen as analogous to killing, 
rather than cowardice. So, just as we want to be sure that a philosopher can kill when 
necessary in battle without developing a blood-lust, we want to be sure that he or she 
can lie when necessary in administration without developing a love of untruth. 
The analogy is appealing, since it neatly re-expresses the sort of point that 
Brickhouse and Smith and Reeve make: lies are to love of truth (love of the true), 
what killing is to moderation regarding the spirited part of one's soul. But the 
analogy fails, because moderation and love of truth are not comparable in this way. 
Moderation requires that we be balanced in the exercise of our capacities; but love of 
truth is an absolute demand, and its being held absolutely is the foremost sign of a 
philosopher during the discussion of philosopher-kings. Given the earlier argument 
that this demand speaks of all parts of one's imitative or worldly practice, not just 
one's engagement with the forms, it should not be qualified by some supposed 
requirements of administration. 
5. Philosophers and Lies 
I will now, after summarising the argument so far, introduce a qualification to the 
assumptions on which the discussion has been based. 
The defences note that the Republic's philosophers (the ones who become 
philosopher-kings) have knowledge of the forms, of the real and the good. They note 
that this knowledge, when applied to administration, means that the rulers, as 
philosophers, know the model they, as rulers, are trying to imitate. In ruling, the 
philosophers must at times lie, because non-philosophers will not be able to 
recognise the coincidence of their own best interest and that of the city (that is, of the 
requirements of justice), but must be brought to take part in an imitation of justice. 
Lies are the tool for this. In this there is no incoherence, for they act in the interests of 
the true and so still love truth (Brickhouse and Smith), and they utter verbal lies, not 
true lies, so do not cause the harm that true lies will (Reeve). 
I have argued that the process of lying is undermining. Verbal lies are imitations of 
true lies, not the true. As imitations they have true lies as their model. The 
philosopher knows the forms, and creates imitations while casting an eye on the 
forms - in both regards the philosopher is a unique type of mortal. This means that in 
the process of uttering a verbal lie, the philosopher must turn from the good to the 
true lie, and in this undermine the philosophical nature by failing to remain constant 
in the centrally defining characteristic of a philosophical nature. 
I have also considered the fact that the philosopher-kings are introduced as mortals. 
The account of education suggests that while mortal natures are given, they are not 
given complete and they do not guarantee knowledge; they must be drawn out of 
potentiality. Furthermore, mortal natures, once formed, are not stable, but require 
discipline and the maintenance of a way of life. That aspect of the Republic shows 
that engagement with worldly untruth corrupts mortal natures. Even if verbal 
administrative lies are not corrupting in the way the first argument suggests, they are 
an engagement in a practice that will re-order and disorder the philosopher's way of 
life. Philosophical natures are subject to even more instability than other mortal 
natures, and so the practice of lying, be the lies in the interest of the true or not, will 
corrupt the natures of philosophers and disable them as imitators of justice. 
In both cases, the philosopher-kings are destroyed by the requirement that they 
engage with two worlds and satisfy the demands of both. 
Now a qualification, not so much to the argument I have presented, but to one of the 
assumptions required by the debate which motivates it. I asked at the beginning that 
we accept, as almost all commentators do, that Plato has Socrates recommend lies, 
and that the philosopher-kings are to be liars. I will say nothing here about the first 
point, but if I am right that a proposal that the Republic's philosopher-kings are to lie 
introduces an incoherent element to the work, an alternative response is to doubt 
that such a proposal is made seriously, or made at all. 
With the idea that the proposal is not made seriously we hit murky (though rich) 
waters, which I will enter only briefly. In a Straussian approach Plato is seen as 
attempting to lead ordinary readers to salutary opinions, but to lead "men possessing 
the best natures" to the truth (see Strauss 1964, pp. 50-55). Applying this reading to 
our concerns, the wise reader will recognise that the idea that philosopher-kings may 
lie is made irrelevant by the absurdity of the thought of a just state, or will recognise 
the proposal as yet another aspect of the absurdity of a just state. Or we may adopt 
an approach such as Drew Hyland's (1990) "hermeneutics of irony." Hyland shares 
some things with the Straussian approach but, in an extended analysis of the Three 
Waves, he derives a much more qualified and complex anti-utopianism. Centrally, 
Strauss found the overt recommendation of communism and equality of the sexes as 
a clear mark of the irony of this part of the Republic (because both are against nature) 
(1964, p. 127). Hyland, however, claims that the argument for gender equality is the 
only serious argument of the Three Waves, and that the irony of the others show that 
Plato thinks the solution to the Second Wave impossible and undesirable, and the 
solution to the Third Wave desirable but improbable and only really applicable to the 
justice of an individual's soul. 
As one other example, we could look to Seery (1992). He finds irony operating at a 
higher level than the Straussians or even Hyland, and uncovers a progressive 
utopianism. As interesting as all this is (see also Berger 1987), I cannot go into it here. 
The point we can take from it is that once we allow the possibility of irony at some 
level above that of Socrates' own dialogic irony, apparent incoherence may become 
evidence, rather than a fault in the text - without here going into the question of just 
what, as evidence, the rulers' lies might point to. 
Or perhaps the proposal is not made at all. This idea can be made consistent with the 
type of interpretation of Plato's project just mentioned, but it causes less interpretive 
strain (if that is a virtue) - and it is surprisingly well supported by the text. For 
instance, nowhere are we told that the philosopher-kings will lie. All we find is that 
philosophers love and honour truth in every way. In the earlier arguments I needed 
to read this according to Brickhouse and Smith's interpretation, but if we take 
seriously the difference between the philosopher-kings and earlier guardians, we 
might see it as applying to verbal lies also. We might also question the assumption 
that the philosopher-kings are mortal. The assumption that they lie means that they 
are mortal, I have argued. But if they are not mortal, then the argument against the 
gods lying applies also to the philosophers. It is true that Socrates only asks that they 
become as "divine and ordered as a human being can" (500d); but he also says that, 
 ... if [the philosophic nature] were to find the best constitution, as it is itself 
the best, it would be clear that it is really divine and that other natures and 
ways of life are merely human. (497c) 
When we combine this with the extraordinary suggestion that the philosophers will 
associate with the forms, whereas in the other middle period dialogues (specifically 
the Symposium and the Phaedrus) this is impossible for mortals we seem to have 
two options. We might conclude that philosopher-kings are divine truth-tellers. This 
reading might be supported by the comment at 502b that "if a ruler established the 
laws and ways of life we've described, it is surely not impossible that the citizens 
would be willing to carry them out," which suggests that they wouldn't need to lie. 
Or, we could say that the philosophers associate with the forms and are mortals, and 
regard this as ironically absurd. So rather than taking the incoherence of the lies as a 
sign of irony, we would take the sign to be the incoherence of the nature of a 
philosopher capable of ruling - a nature both human and divine. 
The argument in Section 4 does not rest on these suggestions. My claim has been that 
a proposal that philosopher-kings lie is incoherent. By the qualifications, I wonder 
whether Plato is committed to such incoherence. 
6. Conclusion: Government and Deceit 
I began with a question about the acceptability of administrative lies in general. I 
then turned to the specific question of the coherence of Plato's philosopher-kings as 
liars. How does the response to Plato (Plato seen as recommending administrative 
lies by philosopher-kings) bear on the response to the general question? Supposing 
(as we must in the context of this discussion) that we can make clear sense of the 
notions of truth and truthfulness,  the following points can be made. 
The account in the Republic can be seen as, in the course of setting out the ideal 
conditions for a just state, setting out the ideal conditions under which 
administrative lying is acceptable. It is acceptable there, if anywhere, because the 
ones who lie genuinely know the truth of the matters of which they speak falsely, 
and genuinely know how to administer lies beneficently, while the ones who are lied 
to are by nature ignorant, spirited and narrow-minded, and thus incapable of 
ordering their lives in the light of the true or the good. Yet, if I am right in Section 4, 
the nature of a Platonic philosopher will be corrupted if it engages in the activity 
which it is, by nature, uniquely able to carry out well. 
Clearly, objections can be raised. Imagine as a respondent someone committed to 
liberal democracy, but who asks that we recognize political reality, plus the vagaries 
of individual and social psychology. Such a person might ask that all this concern 
with the Republic should be put aside: we should make judgements by weighing 
liberal principles against political and psychological reality. It might then be argued 
that while honesty is the ideal of representative democracy, a degree of (judicious) 
dishonesty will be necessary and indeed virtuous, in the general interest. We might 
be asked to imagine what would happen if the leaders of modern democratic states 
were indiscriminately honest. 
Well, probably we will never know; yet we do know what happens often enough as 
things stand - and these things happen because we lack the ideal conditions on 
which Plato's position might draw. Our leaders are not chosen in virtue of their being 
philosophers - even were there Platonic philosophers on which to call - and their 
'viciousness' and 'ignorance' means that they lack the capacity to lie wisely 
(medicinally). Furthermore, the need to lie recognized by Plato arises from his 
assumption of the incorrigible ignorance and narrow-mindedness of the many. If we 
deny any metaphysical basis for this assumption, if we insist that the modern citizen 
is not incorrigibly unable to recognize the general good, the second side of an 
attempted justification also falls. 
Thus, the Republic remains relevant, for this response simply repeats part of the 
position of the Republic, but adds a liberal regret. What it lacks is a principled 
account of the necessity of administrative lies, or of the possibility of their judicious 
application. 
Yet a stronger response can be made. Why not grant the fallibility of leaders, and the 
(relative) perfectibility of the many, and then think of the necessity of what we might 
call protective lies (as a subset of medicinal lies)? It might be suggested that a state's 
international position could surely not sustain unqualified non-domestic openness. 
Imagine the requirements of a state at war, for example. If this were granted as  a 
situation in which lies were justified, it would then follow that this type of 
dishonesty requires - and so indirectly justifies - a level of domestic dishonesty. The 
point here would be that the state cannot afford to have members undermining the 
party line. Furthermore, noting that lies towards one's enemies begin the explication 
of acceptable verbal lies at 382, we could in turn try to justify lies towards the insane 
and foolish. The respondent might acknowledge that we cannot assume with Plato 
that the many are in some sense always insane or foolish - but point out that on 
occasion something like this would arise. An example is a threatened run on the 
banks caused by public panic, in the face of which government officials might lie in 
the hope of avoiding economic collapse. Another example might be again in war, 
when domestic panic would undermine the state's defence, and can be forestalled by 
lies. 
I think that the possibility of such cases mean that we should resist a blanket denial 
of the acceptability of administrative lies - and allow the possibility of necessary 
defensive lies. But I also want to highlight the weaknesses of the appeal. First, the 
appeal assumes that we can reliably identify such cases - cases in which dishonest 
would be an effective (and the only) way of defending the state. Yet it is hard to see 
how this would be possible. So we might allow that such cases are justified occasions 
of lying, but be unsure just when such cases arise. Secondly, even if such cases can be 
identified, the intuitions in favour of them being justified occasions for lies depend 
on an as yet unjustified faith in the capacity of leaders to lie well and virtuously, to 
lie so as to effectively defend the state. Thirdly, even were these problems overcome, 
we return to the corrupting effect of the lies. These occasions, supposing that they 
possess specific justification, are likely (unless we have leaders with very special 
characteristics, or a cleverly worked-out system of change of leadership after crises) 
to generate an administrative culture of secrecy and deceit, and be used by extension 
in the service of self-interest and expediency - possibly undoing any good the 
original lies may have achieved. These concerns suggest while the cases invoked 
have strong intuitive appeal, this depends on the satisfaction of conditions which we 
have little or no reason to expect. 
A parenthetical comment in the last paragraph suggests a further qualification.  My 
position depends in part on there being no account, different from Plato's, according 
to which administrative omniscience (or something sufficiently close to omniscience) 
is possible, yet allowing us to avoid the incoherence to which Plato's rulers-as-liars 
are subject. I accept that. Yet I am unable to imagine what such an account would 
look like. 
Thus, while noting the partial qualifications, I deny that administrative lies can be 
justified. My denial does not rest on a naive belief in the wisdom or rationality of 
modern citizens; nor does it rest on setting the form of justice as our goal. Rather, the 
denial involves first, rejecting any metaphysical basis for the general incorrigibility of 
'the many', second, pointing out that our leaders are drawn from the many, and 
third, noting that even if something like Platonic conditions could be invoked, this 
would not, because of the corrupting effects of such acts, justify administrative lies. 
I return to the point of using the Republic as a vehicle for the discussion. The 
Republic can be seen as setting out the ideal conditions for the in-principle 
acceptability of governing or administrative lies. These ideal conditions, in turn, are 
the epitome of the 'realism' to which a defender of such lies is inclined to appeal. 
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